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INTRODUCTION
On September 22, 2004, the U.S. Department of Justice an-
nounced the impending release of Yaser Esam Hamdi, the American-
t B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 2003; J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2006. I
would like to thank my parents for their continuing love and support, Marilyn Clark and
Alison Fraser for their substantive input, Sue Pado and Kelly Wilson for all of their assis-
tance, and my friends for keeping things interesting.
1 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
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born "enemy combatant" taken into custody after the surrender of his
Taliban military unit in Afghanistan.2 As a condition of release,
Hamdi signed an agreement with the U.S. government in which he
vowed "formally to renounce any claim that he may have to United
States nationality."' 3 In accordance with this agreement (Release
Agreement), the United States transferred Hamdi to Saudi Arabia on
October 11, 2004.4 The Release Agreement specified that Hamdi
must remain in Saudi Arabia until September 2009 and be subject to
strict travel restrictions and monitoring by the Saudi government. 5
In the United States, it is well established that "the Government
cannot sever its relationship to the people by taking away their citizen-
ship";6 yet in the renunciation provision of the Release Agreement,
the government sought to achieve this very goal. By conditioning
Hamdi's release on the formal renunciation of his citizenship, the Re-
lease Agreement deprives Hamdi of the rights he would enjoy as a
U.S. citizen in the event of his recapture 7 and raises questions about
the requirement of voluntary intent when severing one's ties to one's
country. Furthermore, the United States' reliance on the Saudi gov-
ernment to enforce the provisions of the Release Agreement sets a
dangerous precedent for the potential transfer of other citizen enemy
combatants either already in custody or yet to be captured.
Part I of this Note discusses the historical progression of the
meaning of U.S. citizenship, the standard of intent in the renuncia-
tion of nationality by U.S. citizens, and the events preceding the Re-
2 Press Release, Mark Corallo, Dir. of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Regarding
Yaser Hamdi (Sept. 22, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/Septem-
ber/04_opa_640.htm [hereinafter DOJ Press Release].
3 Motion of Defendant to Stay Proceedings 8, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 2:02CV439
(E.D. Va. Sept. 24, 2004), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/usilaw/in-
thecourts/hamdi-briefs/HamdiAgreement.pdf [hereinafter Release Agreement]
("Hamdi agrees to appear before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States...
to renounce any claim that he may have to United States nationality pursuant to Section
349(a) (5) [of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)].").
4 See Press Release, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, Transfer of
Yaser Esam Hamdi to Saudi Arabia (Oct. 11, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/prs/ps/2004/36983.htm [hereinafter DOS Press Release]. Prior to the Release Agree-
ment, Hamdi was a dual citizen of the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. See
Man Held as Enemy Combatant to be Freed Soon: Required to Give Up U.S. Citizenship, CNN.coM,
Sept. 22, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/09/22/hamdi/index.html [hereinafter
Man Held as Enemy Combatant].
5 Release Agreement, supra note 3, 1 6, 9-11.
6 Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 257.
7 See Release Agreement, supra note 3, 12 ("Hamdi agrees that if he does not fulfill
any of the conditions of this Agreement, he may be detained immediately insofar as consis-
tent with the law of armed conflict."); see also Enemy Combatant's Release Delayed: Saudi Gov-
ernment Objects to Terms of Release, CNN.coM, Sept. 29, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/
LAW/09/29/hamdi.release/ [hereinafter Enemy Combatant's Release Delayed] ("[I]f Hamdi
violate[s] the agreement 'he may be taken back into custody as an enemy combatant."'
(quoting a Senior Justice Department official)).
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lease Agreement. Part II examines the constitutionality and
contractual validity of the Release Agreement. Part III considers the
Saudi response to the Release Agreement and evaluates this response
to demonstrate how the United States should alter its method of deal-
ing with future citizen enemy combatants in order to respect its duties
to its allies. Part III concludes by articulating the likely effects of the
Release Agreement on international relations and warning of the dan-
gers associated with the United States maintaining its current release-
agreement strategy.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Citizenship in the United States and the Historical Standard
of Intent in the Renunciation of Nationality
As one scholar has noted, "The theoretical and practical impor-
tance of U.S. citizenship lies in its being related to the values embod-
ied in the U.S. Constitution. '8  Since the earliest period of
colonization, the concept of citizenship has played a primary role in
the formation of Americans' political and social identities.9 Although
notions of citizenship have changed throughout U.S. history, the
modern view of citizenship contemplates a voluntary contract between
the individual and the government.10 In exchange for allegiance to
the sovereign, the citizen retains the right to due process and equal
protection of the laws, as well as the constitutional guarantee that the
state will not abridge his privileges and immunities.11 The question of
when-and how-a citizen may renounce his nationality has domi-
nated the historical progression to this current conception of citizen-
ship in Congress and the judiciary. 12
8 HENRY S. MATTEo, DENATIONALIZATION V. "THE RIGHT TO HAVE RIGHTS": THE STAN-
DARD OF INTENT IN CITIZENSHIP Loss 1 (1997).
9 See id. at 19-24 (discussing four major shifts in the American concept of citizenship:
(1) the early seventeenth-century view-reflected in Lord Coke's statement, made in
1608-that the colonists must remain loyal to the king by virtue of the ruler-subject rela-
tionship; (2) pre-Revolutionary sentiments that allegiance to a sovereign is not inherent in
a monarchy, but rather exists as a matter of individual choice; (3) Revolutionary War era
championing of this consent-based citizenship; and finally (4) the post-Civil War inclusion
of blacks in the citizenry through the Fourteenth Amendment and the civil rights struggles
of the modern era); see alsoJOHN DENVIR, DEMOCRACY'S CONSTITUTION: CLAIMING THE PRIVI-
LEGES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP ix-xi (2001) (describing the changing concept of citizen-
ship in the United States and proposing "privileges of American citizenship" for the twenty-
first century).
10 See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
11 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; DENVIR, supra note 9, at 5.
12 See MATTEO, supra note 8, at 29-32.
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In 1830, the Supreme Court first examined the issue of expatria-
tion in Shanks v. Dupont.13 The Court's holding in Shanks-that a
woman born in the American colonies before the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, and thus born under allegiance to Britain, who was mar-
ried to a British officer and living in England, remained a British
citizen unless an act of the British government released her from that
allegiance-demonstrated the American judicial system's early obser-
vance of the doctrine of perpetual allegiance to the British crown.
14
Because the Court's view of expatriation conflicted with the prevailing
American revolutionary view of citizenship as a voluntary contract be-
tween the people and the sovereign, however, the Court generally
avoided involvement in expatriation cases.15 With the courts relatively
silent on expatriation, "it was [thus] up to Congress... to set the rules
for citizenship loss."16
In the post-Civil War era, Congress established that citizenship,
in effect, was the citizen's to lose at the government's whim. In 1864,
Congress passed the Wade-Davis Bill, requiring individuals in former
Confederate states to swear allegiance to the Constitution and declar-
ing that any of these individuals who held a civil or military office in
service of the Confederacy in the future would automatically lose his
U.S. citizenship. 17 The Enrollment Act of March 3, 1865 announced
that military deserters would lose not only their rights to citizenship,
but also their rights ever to become citizens.18 In enacting the Expa-
triation Act of 1868, Congress moved beyond the Reconstruction and
military contexts and announced that all people had the "natural and
inherent right" to expatriate. 19
After this sweeping proclamation, Congress remained silent on
expatriation until the early twentieth century, when it passed a series
of laws articulating how citizens could "exercise" their rights to re-
13 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242 (1830).
14 See id. at 246-47 ("[Shanks's] subsequent removal with her husband operated as a
virtual dissolution of her allegiance, and fixed her future allegiance to the British crown by
the treaty of peace of 1783."); MArEo, supra note 8, at 34 (noting that the Court's holding
was based on the terms of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1783); see also Sarah Helene Duggin &
Mary Beth Collins, "Natural Born" in the USA: The Striking Unfairness and Dangerous Ambiguity
of the Constitution's Presidential Qualifications Clause and Why We Need To Fix It, 85 B.U. L. REv.
53, 135 (2005) (" [T)he English common law doctrine of perpetual allegiance.., held that
the relationship between subject and sovereign endured forever; individuals were deemed
incapable of transferring allegiance to any other sovereign.").
15 See MATrEO, supra note 8, at 32-33.
16 Id. at 33.
17 See Mark Gibney, Decommunization: Human Rights Lessons from the Past and Present,
and Prospects for the Future, 23 DENV.J. INr'L L. & POL'Y 87, 91 (1994) (describing treatment
of Confederate officials after the Civil War). Although the Wade-Davis Bill never became
law due to President Lincoln's exercise of the pocket veto, the Bill still remains a notewor-
thy example of early Congressional attempts to control citizenship. Id.
18 Ch. 79, § 21, 13 Stat. 487, 490.
19 Ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (2000)).
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nounce their nationality. 20 For example, the Act of June 29, 1906
mandated denaturalization for citizens who acquired their citizenship
through fraud or other illegal means.21 This act was followed by the
Expatriation Act of 1907, which listed specific voluntary acts that, if
performed, would lead to expatriation. 22
Responding to this legislation, the Supreme Court reentered the
expatriation arena with its 1915 decision in Mackenzie v. Hare.23 The
case dealt with a challenge to a provision of the Expatriation Act of
1907, which mandated that an American woman who married a for-
eign man would automatically expatriate and assume her husband's
nationality.24 In upholding the statute's validity, the Court deferred
to congressional views on citizenship, explaining that Congress was
merely exercising its implied powers to perform its delegated duties
and that the provision represented a reasonable exercise of govern-
ment power, designed to avoid embarrassment in the conduct of for-
eign affairs. 25
After Congress passed the Nationality Act of 1940, which man-
dated, among other specific denationalizing acts, expatriation for in-
dividuals remaining outside the country to avoid military service,2 6 the
Supreme Court broke from its tradition of deferring to Congress and
began taking a more active role in preserving the voluntary nature of
citizenship and expatriation.27 This judicial protection culminated in
the Court's 1967 decision in Afroyim v. Rusk, which held for the first
time that Congress lacked the authority to take away an individual's
citizenship without that individual's consent-in effect establishing
20 See MATTEO, supra note 8, at 35.
21 Ch. 3592, 34 Stat. 596 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000)).
22 Ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228 (listing adopting foreign citizenship and swearing fealty to a
foreign country as expatriating acts), amended by Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, 48 Stat. 797.
23 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
24 See id. at 307.
25 See id. at 311-12.
26 See Ch. 876, § 401(c), 54 Stat. 1137, 1169 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1481-1503 (2000)).
27 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-04 (1958) (plurality opinion) (holding that
section 401(g) of the Nationality Act violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment); Mitsugi v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 137-38 (1958) (finding
that the Government failed to meet the "clear, convincing and unequivocal" standard to
prove a citizen's intent to expatriate); see also Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168-69
(1964) (invalidating a section of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 186 (1963) (striking down another provision of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1952); MAI-rEo, supra note 8, at 37-41; Steven S. Good-
man, Protecting Citizenship: Strengthening the Intent Requirement in Expatriation Proceedings, 56
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 341, 344-45 (1988) (discussing ChiefJustice Warren's dissenting opin-
ion in Perez v. Brownwell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), overruled in part, Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S.
253 (1967), and noting that later Supreme Court decisions ultimately incorporated Chief
Justice Warren's views of Congress's powerlessness to strip citizens of their citizenship
involuntarily).
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citizenship as a constitutional right.28 Justice Black's majority opinion
in Aftoyim formally acknowledged American citizenship as a voluntary
social contract between the sovereign people and their government.29
As such, Justice Black reasoned, Congress had "no express power to
strip people of their citizenship. "80 Afroyim's discussion of Congress's
powerlessness to expatriate citizens involuntarily remains the bench-
mark for the modern judicial conception of American citizenship. 31
The Court's 1980 holding in Vance v. Terrazas expanded upon Afroyim,
firmly establishing that an individual renouncing his citizenship must
do so both voluntarily and with a specific intent to expatriate, and that
such intent must be either directly expressed or fairly inferred from
proved conduct.32
Congress codified this intent requirement in the Immigration
and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986,3 but Afroyim and Terrazas
had already established the basic requirement that if the issue of in-
tent is raised, the burden of proving intent falls on the party asserting
expatriation. 34 Ultimately, the keys to the intent inquiry are both
whether the individual's renunciation of citizenship is voluntary and
whether the expatriating act "reasonably manifest[s] [the] individ-
ual's transfer or abandonment of allegiance to the United States. ' 35
Thus, today, unless an individual manifests this specific intent to re-
nounce citizenship, an expatriating act will have no effect.
B. Yaser Esam Hamdi and Hamdi, v. Rumsfeld
In light of Afroyim and Terrazas, Yaser Hamdi's story and the judi-
cial proceedings leading up to the Release Agreement raise questions
about whether the government's demand for his expatriation is con-
stitutional. Hamdi, born in Louisiana in 1980 and hence an American
28 See 387 U.S. at 257; Goodman, supra note 27, at 345-46 (noting that Afroyim over-
ruled Perez and implemented Chief Justice Warren's views on citizenship).
29 See Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 257.
30 Id.
31 See MATrEO, supra note 8, at 45; see also Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 260 (1980)
(noting that Afroyim recognized that "Congress [does not have] any general power, express
or implied, to take away an American citizen's citizenship without his assent").
32 Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 260.
33 See Pub. L. No. 99-653, sec. 18(a), 100 Stat. 3655, 3658 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1841 (2000)) (adding the language "voluntarily performing any of the following
acts with the intention to relinquishing United States nationality" after the language "shall
lose his nationality by" to section 349(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act); see also
MATrEO, supra note 8, at 58 (noting that " ' relinquishment ... must be voluntary, con-
forming to Supreme Court interpretations'" of specific intent to expatriate as discussed in
Terrazas and Aftoyim) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-916, at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6182, 6183).
34 See MArYrEo, supra note 8, at 54.
35 Id. (quoting Attorney General's Statement of Interpretation of Afrayim, 42 Op. Att'y
Gen. 397, 397 (1969)). Afrtyim does not explicitly specify what words or conduct qualify as
voluntary renunciation. See id.
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citizen, moved with his family to Saudi Arabia as a child.3 6 Although
he left the United States, Hamdi retained dual citizenship between
the United States and Saudi Arabia.37 In 2001, Hamdi traveled from
Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan.3 8 According to the declaration of
Michael Mobbs, Special Advisor to the Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy, members of the Northern Alliance military coalition captured
Hamdi after the surrender of his Taliban unit in 2001.3 9 Hamdi sur-
rendered a Kalishnikov assault rifle, and the Northern Alliance forces
then took him into custody.40 The Northern Alliance turned Hamdi
over to the U.S. military, which detained and questioned Hamdi in
Afghanistan and later transferred him to the U.S. Naval Base in Guan-
tanamo Bay.41 When authorities learned of Hamdi's American citi-
zenship, they transferred him to a military brig in Charleston, South
Carolina. 42
Because al Qaeda and the Taliban qualify as hostile forces en-
gaged in armed conflict with the United States, "individuals associated
with those groups were and continue to be enemy combatants. '43
Thus, Hamdi's association with the Taliban led to his designation as
an enemy combatant, and the Government claimed the right to de-
tain him without formal charges or proceedings. 44 Hamdi's father, as
next friend, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of his
son in June 2002.45 The petition asserted that Hamdi, as an American
citizen, enjoyed the "full protections of the Constitution" and that his
detention violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 46
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found
this citizen's rights claim persuasive. The court appointed a federal
public defender and ordered that Hamdi be allowed access to coun-
36 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (plurality opinion).
37 Man Held as Enemy Combatant, supra note 4.
38 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510. The parties disputed the nature of Hamdi's travel to Af-
ghanistan. See id. at 511-12. Hamdi's father contended that his son went to Afghanistan in
2001 to do "relief work," that he had been in the country less than two months at the time
of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and that he was trapped in the country after
the start of the U.S. military campaign. Id. The Government asserted that Hamdi traveled
to Afghanistan in July or August 2001, at which time he "affiliated with a Taliban military
unit and received weapons training." Id. at 512-13.
39 Id. at 512-13. The Mobbs Declaration remains the primary source of information
regarding Hamdi's actions in Afghanistan; Mobbs obtained his information on Hamdi
from a "review of relevant records and reports" in the case. Id. at 512.
40 Id. at 513.
41 Id. at 510.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 513 (internal quotations omitted).
44 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 473 (4th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the
Mobbs Declaration, "if accurate," was sufficient to justify Hamdi's detention), vacated and
remanded, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
45 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 511.
46 Id. at 511.
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sel.4 7 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this order, hold-
ing that the District Court had not shown proper deference to the
government's security and intelligence interests. 48 The Fourth Circuit
further concluded that "if Hamdi is indeed an 'enemy combatant'
who was captured during hostilities in Afghanistan, the government's
present detention of him is a lawful one."4 9 The court later held; how-
ever, that Hamdi's citizenship did entitle him to "a limited judicial
inquiry into his detention," though this review should not extend to a
full analysis of the factual determinations surrounding his capture. 50
On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the
judgment of the Fourth Circuit.5' Justice O'Connor's plurality opin-
ion focuses on the limited question of whether the Executive has the
authority to detain an American citizen who was engaged in armed
conflict against the United States, by either supporting or affiliating
with forces hostile to the United States in Afghanistan, as an enemy
combatant. 52 The plurality concluded that the Authorization for Use
of Military Force (AUMF) 5 3 authorized Hamdi's detention and consti-
tuted an act of Congress that negated Hamdi's rights as a citizen
under the Non-Detention Act.5 4 Justice O'Connor's opinion calls the
detention of enemy combatants "fundamental and accepted [as] an
incident to war,"55 and affirmatively states that "[t] here is no bar to
this Nation's holding one of its own citizens as an enemy
combatant. "56
After holding that Hamdi could be legally detained for no longer
than the duration of the hostilities in Afghanistan, a conclusion unre-
lated to his citizenship, the Hamdi plurality turned to the question of
the process due to citizens who challenge their status as enemy com-
batants. 57 Based on a balancing of the citizen's constitutional rights
against the Government's interests in national security, the plurality
47 See id. at 512.
48 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 2002), rev'd and remanded, 316 F.3d
450 (2003), vacated and remanded, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
49 Id. at 283.
50 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 475.
51 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516.
52 See id.
53 S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 224 (2001). Congress passed this resolution one
week after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks that killed more than 3,000 people in
New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania. See id.; Timeline: September 11, 2001,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/marchl1/timeline/oneb.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2006). In
the AUMF, Congress granted the President the power "to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks .... " S.J. Res. 23.
54 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517.
55 Id. at 518.
56 Id. at 519.
57 Id. at 524-25.
934 [Vol. 91:927
THE YASER HAMDI RELEASE AGREEMENT
concluded that a citizen-detainee must receive notice of the factual
basis for his classification as an enemy combatant, as well as a fair op-
portunity to rebut the Government's allegations before a neutral deci-
sion maker.58 To justify continued detention, the decision maker
must find that the Government has proven the enemy combatant sta-
tus of the citizen beyond a mere "some evidence" standard. 59 The
plurality carefully noted, however, that citizen enemy combatant pro-
ceedings "may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to
burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict."60
Concurring and dissenting in part, Justice Souter based his opin-
ion on the historical context of wartime citizen internment. 61 Accord-
ing to Justice Souter, although the Government argued that its
detention of Hamdi represented "nothing more than customary de-
tention of a captive taken on the field of battle," 62 the history of the
Non-Detention Act requires that the Executive detain citizens only
upon clear authority from Congress. 63 Justice Souter concluded that
the AUMF did not provide a clear statement of authority in Hamdi's
case.
64
Likewise, in his dissent, Justice Scalia discussed the importance of
Hamdi's presumed citizenship with respect to his claim of unlawful
detention.65 Justice Scalia focused on the conflict between national
security and Hamdi's "constitutional right to personal liberty" as an
American citizen. 66 He contended that while the plurality described
wartime detention procedures that would apply to enemy aliens,
Hamdi's status as a citizen should have left the Government with two
options-either charge Hamdi with treason or suspend the writ of
habeas corpus.67 As the writ was not suspended, and since Hamdi
challenged his classification as an enemy combatant, Justice Scalia
58 Id. at 533.
59 Id. at 537.
60 Id. at 533 (announcing that hearsay testimony, for example, would be acceptable if
it represented the most reliable available evidence the Government could offer, and estab-
lishing a burden-shifting scheme that requires the citizen to rebut the Government's evi-
dence with more persuasive evidence that he was not an enemy combatant).
61 See id. at 542-45 (Souter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944)).
62 Id. at 549.
63 Id. Congress passed the Non-Detention Act to supersede the Emergency Detention
Act of 1950, which authorized the Attorney General to detain anyone suspected of espio-
nage or sabotage in times of "emergency." Id. at 542-43. To Justice Souter, this "pro-
vide[d] a powerful reason to think that [the Non-Detention Act] was meant to require
clear congressional authorization before any citizen can be placed in a cell." Id. at 543.
64 Id. at 551.
65 See id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66 Id.
67 See id. at 559, 562, 573.
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concluded that Hamdi's citizenship entitled him to either a criminal
trial or a judicial decree mandating his release. 68
II
THE HAMDI AGREEMENT
The Justices' underlying concerns with citizenship, evident
throughout their Hamdi opinions, hint at exactly what Hamdi relin-
quished when he signed the Release Agreement and renounced any
claim to his U.S. citizenship. 69 In the Release Agreement, signed by
Hamdi on September 15, 2004, Hamdi maintained that he was never
affiliated with the Taliban or al Qaeda and thus was not an enemy
combatant because he was never "part of or supported forces hostile
to the United States and[ ] never engaged in armed conflict against
the United States. '70 The Agreement maintains that Hamdi's birth in
Louisiana establishes his claim to U.S. citizenship, but also states that
Hamdi "considers himself to be a citizen of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia."71
Under the Agreement, Hamdi not only agreed to renounce his
citizenship formally pursuant to section 349(a) (5) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act,7 2 but he also agreed to "renounce[ ] terrorism
and violent jihad"73 and vowed never to affiliate with the Taliban, al
Qaeda, or any person or group designated as a "terrorist" or "terrorist
organization" by the United States. 74 He also agreed to residency and
travel restrictions75 and promised to notify Saudi and U.S. authorities
immediately if he encounters known terrorists or members of terrorist
organizations, becomes aware of any planned or executed terrorist at-
tacks, or is solicited to engage in or harbor those involved in "combat-
ant activities." 76 Hamdi released the United States from any liability
for violations of "United States, foreign, or international law" arising
from the government's conduct prior to the Release Agreement and
68 Id. at 572-73.
69 See Release Agreement, supra note 3, 8.
70 Id. at 1.
71 Id.
72 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (2000) ("A person who is a national of the United States
whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by voluntarily performing any
of the following acts with the intention of relinquishing United States nationality... (5)
making a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the
United States in a foreign state . . ").
73 Release Agreement, supra note 3, 7 7-8.
74 Id. 5.
75 Id. 9 (requiring Hamdi to remain in Saudi Arabia for five years without travel).
Additionally, the Release Agreement prohibited Hamdi from traveling to the United States
for ten years, and thereafter required him to receive the express permission of the Secre-
taries of Defense and Homeland Security before "initiating travel to the United States." Id.
10.
76 Id. 6.
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from any challenges to the Agreement's terms.77 Interestingly, Hamdi
agreed that if he failed to meet any of the conditions of the Agree-
ment, "he [could] be detained immediately insofar as consistent with
the law of armed conflict"78-essentially authorizing his treatment as a
noncitizen enemy combatant if he ever violates the Agreement and if
the United States subsequently recaptures him. 79
A. What Did Hamdi Lose?
1. Waiver of Rights Against the United States
The circumstances surrounding Hamdi's detention and the
terms of the Release Agreement may potentially warrant a suit against
the government. However, the Release Agreement leaves Hamdi with-
out the opportunity to challenge the government on the terms or du-
ration of his detainment as an enemy combatant.80 Thus, even
though a potential challenge against the government's pre-Agreement
conduct may have merit, it is unlikely that Hamdi can raise such a
challenge now that the government has released him. Hamdi re-
ceived his freedom because of the Release Agreement, and although
this freedom is subject to certain restrictions, it is doubtful that he
would now challenge his prerelease conditions and risk his liberty by
potentially violating the waiver provision of the Release Agreement.81
The Hamdi plurality's recognition of the government's ability to
detain its own citizens as enemy combatants in wartime might also
limit Hamdi's chances of successfully challenging his detention. 82
Furthermore, even if Hamdi decided to challenge the waiver provi-
sion in an attempt to adjudicate the government's pre-Agreement
conduct, the Release Agreement provides that any challenges arising
under or relating to the Agreement must be adjudicated in the East-
ern District of Virginia.83 Since the Release Agreement does not allow
Hamdi to enter the United States for ten years, the jurisdictional pro-
vision would make any litigation efforts highly complicated and
77 Id. 13.
78 Id 12.
79 See supra note 7 and accompanying text; infra Part II.A.2.
80 See Release Agreement, supra note 3, 13 ("Hamdi hereby releases, waives, forfeits,
relinquishes and forever discharges the United States ... from any and all claims for any
violation of United States, foreign, or international law arising from acts or omissions oc-
curring prior to the official date of this Agreement .... ").
81 See id. 11 12-13. Under paragraph 12 of the Release Agreement, if Hamdi fails to
"fulfill any of the conditions of th[e] Agreement, he may be detained immediately." Id. 1
12. Paragraph 12 does not provide an exception for the waiver provision, suggesting that if
Hamdi attempted to challenge the United States in any forum, he could be recaptured. See
id.
82 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("There is no
bar to this Nation's holding one of its own citizens as an enemy combatant.").
83 Release Agreement, supra note 3, 1 14.
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costly.84 Thus, given that Hamdi is unlikely to challenge the pre-
Agreement conditions, the waiver of his claims against the govern-
ment has fewer implications than do the practical effects of renounc-
ing his U.S. citizenship.
2. Agreement to Renounce Citizenship
Theoretically, Hamdi's agreement to renounce his U.S. citizen-
ship8 5 operates as an additional waiver of rights against the govern-
ment-a waiver of his process rights in the event of future recapture
by the United States. Although Hamdi's recapture and detainment is
unlikely, an analysis of such a hypothetical situation highlights the sig-
nificance of Hamdi's agreement to expatriate.
Because Hamdi was a U.S. citizen when he was captured in 2001,
he was transferred from Guantanamo Bay to a military brig in the
United States, had access to counsel, and was entitled to notice of the
factual basis for his classification as enemy combatant as well as a fair
opportunity to rebut the government's allegations before a neutral
decisionmaker.8 6 In contrast, the current procedures for noncitizens
detained at Guantanamo Bay do not offer this level of process before
classifying the noncitizen detainees as enemy combatants. Although
noncitizen detainees are able to file habeas corpus petitions in federal
district court in order to dispute the legality of their detentions,8 7 they
must dispute their enemy combatant classifications before a Combat-
ant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT).88 A CSRT consists of a neutral,
three-officer panel,89 and while it assigns a military officer to the de-
tainee as a personal representative during tribunal proceedings, it
does not provide access to counsel.90 At the review hearing, the de-
tainee may testify, call witnesses, or introduce other evidence; the tri-
bunal then makes a closed-door determination of the detainee's
status.9 ' This basic process given to noncitizens challenging their en-
emy combatant classifications is lacking as compared to the process
due to a citizen bringing a similar challenge. Thus, if Hamdi's renun-
84 Id. 10.
85 See id. 1 8.
86 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510, 533.
87 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004).
88 See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Combatant Status Review Tribunal Order Is-
sued (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr2004077-
0992.html; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding the
validity of the CSRTs).
89 See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., supra note 88.
90 See id.
91 See id. As of March 2005, only thirty-eight of 558 detainees to go before a tribunal
had been found not to be enemy combatants. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF. COMBATANT STATUS
REVIEw TRIBUNAL SUMMARY (2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Mar2005/d20050329csrt.pdf (summarizing the Convening Authority Rear Admiral James
M. McGarrah's review of nineteen detainee tribunals).
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ciation of his citizenship is valid, he has in effect waived his due pro-
cess rights in the event of recapture by the government.
B. Is the Release Agreement Valid?
A fundamental question regarding the Release Agreement is
whether the Agreement is constitutionally valid and enforceable as an
instrument of expatriation. While the longstanding American con-
ception of citizenship as a contract between the citizen and the gov-
ernment might support the conclusion that the Agreement is a valid
expression of Hamdi's intent to "contract out" of his relationship with
the United States,92 the Supreme Court's intent jurisprudence 93 and
principles of contract law94 suggest otherwise.
Under the Afroyim and Terrazas intent standard and view of citi-
zenship as a constitutional right, Hamdi's renunciation of his citizen-
ship must be both voluntary and committed with the express intent to
expatriate. 95 Therefore, any agreement renouncing citizenship must
be made under circumstances that allow a voluntary and intentional
decision to expatriate. 96 Duress is understood to deprive a party to an
agreement of his capacity to act voluntarily; 97 thus, if Hamdi signed
the Agreement under duress, his agreement to renounce his citizen-
ship would be invalid under Afroyim and Terrazas.
The Restatement (First) of Contracts defines duress, in pertinent part,
as
any wrongful threat of one person by words or other conduct that
induces another to enter into a transaction under the influence of
such fear as precludes him from exercising free will and judgment,
if the threat was intended or should reasonably have been expected
to operate as an inducement. 98
The drafters of the Restatement clarified that the threat requirement is
satisfied by the threat of any future situation-including continued
92 For a discussion of this conception of citizenship, see supra notes 10-11 and accom-
panying text.
93 See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 270 (1980) (requiring the government to prove
voluntary and intentional expatriation by a preponderance of the evidence before it may
expatriate a U.S. citizen); see also Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (holding that
citizens have a constitutional right to remain citizens unless they voluntarily relinquish
their citizenship).
94 See 28 RicHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CorNrRAcrs BY SAMUEL WILLIS-
TON §§ 71:34, 71:43 (4th ed. 2003) (noting that duress or coercion can exist when there is
a threat to continue existing imprisonment or when there is unequal bargaining power
between the parties).
95 See Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 261.
96 See id.
97 See 25 AM. JUR. 2D Duress and Undue Influence § 1 (2004) ("[D]uress ... causes the
person to do an act or form a contract not of his or her own volition."); see also Terrazas, 444
U.S. at 268-70 (discussing duress as an affirmative defense in expatriation proceedings).
98 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 492 (1932).
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imprisonment-that operates as "a mere continuance of what has al-
ready been begun . . . or at least [where] a wrong will not be
righted."99
At the time Hamdi signed the Release Agreement, the govern-
ment had detained him for nearly three years.' 00 With no definite
release date, and with no projected release date short of the end of
active combat operations in Afghanistan 01 or a potential determina-
tion by the government that he no longer posed a threat to the
United States, 10 2 Hamdi arguably perceived that accepting the terms
of the Release Agreement was the only foreseeable way to end his de-
tention. Given Hamdi's limited options, the threat of continued de-
tention afforded the government unequal bargaining power over
Hamdi during negotiations, and Hamdi therefore promised to re-
nounce his citizenship (along with the other provisions of the Agree-
ment) under duress. Such a promise does not satisfy the requirement
of voluntary intent, 03 which in turn casts doubt on whether Hamdi
renounced his citizenship with the requisite specific intent to expatri-
ate. Thus, from a contractual-and constitutional-standpoint, the
Release Agreement represents an invalid means of expatriation.
The government could argue that the Release Agreement should
not be analyzed under general contract principles due to the security
and policy considerations associated with Hamdi's status as an enemy
combatant. However, even analogizing the Release Agreement to ei-
ther a plea bargain or a release-dismissal agreement' 04-agreements
in which the government's greater bargaining power does not auto-
matically indicate a situation of duress-the Agreement still fails to
satisfy the Aftoyim and Terrazas voluntary intent standard. 10 5
99 Id. cmt. d (noting that the threat of continued imprisonment constitutes a source
of duress if that fear secures one's consent to a transaction); see also LORD, supra note 94,
§ 71:34 ("Imprisonment operates as a means of coercion only because of its threatened
continuance.").
100 Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to Saudi Arabia: US. Citizen's Detention as Enemy Com-
batant Sparked Fierce Debate, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at A2, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23958-20040ct 1 .html.
101 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) (plurality opinion).
102 See DOJ Press Release, supra note 2.
103 See LORD, supra note 94, §§ 71:34, 71:43.
104 See Michael C. Dorf, Have We Heard the Last of Yaser Hamdi? Why His Promise Not to
Sue the Government May Not be Binding, FINDLAw.COM, Sept. 29, 2004, http://
writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20040929.html (describing a "release-dismissal agreement" as
a contract between "a criminal defendant who is also a plaintiff in a lawsuit against the
government," whereby the individual agrees to drop his civil claim against the government
"in exchange for the government's agreement to drop the criminal charges against him").
105 See generally id. (stating that a federal appeals court "had said that release-dismissal
agreements were categorically unenforceable [in part because] . . . the threat of prosecu-
tion exerts so much pressure on a criminal defendant/civil plaintiff, that his decision to
drop the lawsuit cannot be treated as truly voluntary" (emphasis omitted)).
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In Brady v. United States,'0 6 the Supreme Court discussed the im-
portance of plea agreements in the American criminal justice system
and set the minimum requirement for such an agreement's validity: A
criminal defendant's plea must represent a voluntary expression of his
own choice, considered in the context of all relevant circumstances.' 0 7
The plea itself is not made voluntarily unless the defendant is "fully
aware of the direct consequences" of his decision, and his decision has
not been induced by threat, misrepresentation, or improper
promises.' 0 8 Thus, even in the plea-agreement context, the circum-
stances surrounding the Release Agreement raise doubts about the
voluntary nature of Hamdi's promise to expatriate. This context, how-
ever, is not an appropriate analogy to Hamdi's situation. Hamdi did
not face criminal prosecution at the time he entered into the Agree-
ment with the government-instead, he faced indefinite detention as
an "enemy combatant" without any knowledge of the charges against
him.10 9 Furthermore, unlike a typical plea agreement, in which a de-
fendant admits guilt, the Release Agreement explicitly states that
"Hamdi maintains that he never... was an enemy combatant."1 10
As Michael Doff suggests, a release-dismissal agreement provides
a much more appropriate analogy to the Release Agreement."' In
the typical release-dismissal agreement, a defendant agrees "to forgo a
civil remedy for the violation of the defendant's constitutional rights
in exchange for complete abandonment of a criminal charge." 112
Whereas a defendant entering a plea agreement admits guilt to re-
ceive leniency from the government, an individual enters a release-
dismissal agreement "merely for the assurance that the State will not
prosecute him for conduct for which he has made no admission of
wrongdoing."' 13 Hamdi waived his rights to sue the government for
its arguably unconstitutional conduct in holding him indefinitely with-
out charges, 1 14 and his promise to expatriate effectively serves as a
waiver of his due process rights in the event of future capture and
106 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
107 See id. at 748.
108 Id. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir. 1957)).
109 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) (plurality opinion). The Hamdi
Court ultimately concluded, "Plainly, the 'process' Hamdi has received is not that to which
he is entitled. . . ." Id. at 538. This implies that Hamdi had not yet received notice of the
factual basis for his classification as enemy combatant or had the opportunity to rebut the
allegations against him. See id. at 536-37.
110 Release Agreement, supra note 3, at 1; see also Dorf, supra note 104 ("A plea bargain
... is in some sense the opposite of the agreement between Hamdi and the government. A
defendant who pleads guilty admits guilt. By contrast, Hamdi has long maintained his
innocence . . ").
Ill See Doff, supra note 104.
112 Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 409 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113 Id. at 410.114 Release Agreement, supra note 3, 1 13.
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detention. 115 In return, by releasing Hamdi from further detention,
the government in effect promised not to "prosecute" Hamdi for his
alleged enemy combatant status.116
Release-dismissal agreements are valid if, after a case-specific anal-
ysis, it is found that the defendant entered the agreement voluntarily,
and that the prosecutor had an independent legitimate reason to
make this agreement directly related to his prosecutorial responsibili-
ties. 11 7 Assuming arguendo that the government's interest in national
security during the War on Terror constitutes a legitimate reason for
its treatment of citizen enemy combatants1 8 and for its entry into the
Release Agreement,1 19 the inquiry turns to whether Hamdi's assent to
the terms of the Release Agreement was truly voluntary.
As the Supreme Court established in Town of Newton v. Rumeyy,
the factors affecting the voluntariness of a release-dismissal agreement
include (1) the defendant's knowledge and experience; (2) the cir-
cumstances of the execution of the release, including access to coun-
sel; (3) the nature and severity of the pending charges; (4) the benefit
to the defendant from signing the release; (5) the existence of a legiti-
mate criminal justice objective for obtaining the release; and (6) the
determination of whether the agreement's execution is subject to ju-
dicial supervision. 120 Hamdi had no knowledge of the American legal
system, had lived in a foreign country since a young age,121 and had
no part in the filing of his initial habeas petition. 122 Although he did
115 See id.; supra Part II.A.2.
116 Justice Stevens's dissent in Rumery raised a concern that the State's "willingness to
drop the charge completely indicates that it might not have proceeded with the prosecu-
tion in any event"-a concern that is most notable in cases in which evidence of wrongdo-
ing is concededly lacking. See 480 U.S. at 409-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The statement
of Saudi Embassy spokesman Nail al-Jubeir, that the United States would not have released
Hamdi if it had believed he was guilty, reflects this underlying tension in the release-dismis-
sal agreement context and further supports the analogy between the Release Agreement
and a typical release-dismissal agreement. See infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
117 See Rumery, 480 U.S. at 397-98.
118 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518-19 (2004) (plurality opinion).
119 But see Doff, supra note 104 ("[U]nlike the prosecution in Rumery, the government
does not appear to have a sound independent reason for the agreement .... It looks as
though the government's principal reason for the agreement is its inability to establish that
Hamdi was an unlawful enemy combatant under procedures that satisfy the Supreme
Court's June decision.").
120 Rumery, 480 U.S. at 401-02 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Rumery, the defendant
was a sophisticated businessman who was not in custody at the time of the agreement and
was represented by experienced counsel. Id. at 394 (plurality opinion). In addition, the
defendant had sufficient time to consider the agreement, and had gained immunity from
criminal prosecution in exchange for abandoning a less-than-certain civil claim. Id. For
these reasons, the Court found his waiver voluntary. Id.
121 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
122 See id. at 510-12. In addition, as Doff suggests, the fact that Hamdi signed the
Release Agreement in Arabic may indicate a lack of familiarity with the English language.
See Doff, supra note 104.
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have access to experienced counsel, Hamdi faced indefinite detention
and the charge of "enemy combatant" if he did not enter into the
Release Agreement.1 23 Hamdi did receive great benefit from the
Agreement, 24 but there was arguably no legitimate criminal-justice
objective furthered by his release. 125 Lastly, there is no evidence that
the Agreement was executed subject to any judicial supervision, as the
parties filed the Release Agreement and Stipulation of Dismissal pur-
suant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) (1) (ii), which allows
dismissal of a pending legal action by the plaintiff alone, without any
action by the court. 12 6
The Court set forth the Rumery voluntariness factors without indi-
cating the relative weights of each; 127 thus, it is difficult to determine
conclusively whether Hamdi entered into the Release Agreement vol-
untarily under this standard. Furthermore, Justice Stevens's dissent in
Rumery raises two concerns not included in the voluntariness inquiry,
but especially relevant in Hamdi's situation: the inherent coerciveness
of an agreement in which the prosecutor agrees to drop all charges
against an individual, and the fact that the agreement "exacts a price
unrelated to the character of the defendant's own conduct."128 For a
detainee with no real knowledge of the charges against him or the
potential length of his detention, the government's ability to offer ex-
oneration and release represents a highly coercive tool. Additionally,
Hamdi's waiver of rights against the government, his promise to expa-
triate, and the conditional terms of release seem disproportionate to
the hearsay evidence of Hamdi's alleged conduct in Afghanistan.1 29
In light of these considerations, as well as the remaining Rumery fac-
123 After Hamdi's release, his counsel effectively summed up the circumstances sur-
rounding the Release Agreement: "'When you've been in solitary confinement for three
years, and somebody puts a piece of paper in front of you that says you can get out of jail
free if you sign it, you don't really worry too much about the rest of the fine print."' See
Phil Hirschkorn, Saudi Once Held by U.S. Returns Home, CNN.coM, Oct. 11, 2004, http://
www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/11/hamdi/. Hamdi's counsel apparently consid-
ered citizenship "little to surrender" in such a situation. See id.
124 Cf Doff, supra note 104 (arguing that the Agreement's benefit to Hamdi was tem-
pered by the "parole-like" conditions of his release).
125 Doff suggests that the Government sought the Agreement because it would have
been difficult to establish that Hamdi was an enemy combatant. See id.
126 See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a) (1) (ii); Release Agreement, supra note 3, Exhibit A (Stipula-
tion of Dismissal).
127 See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 397-98 (1987).
128 Id. at 411 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens's dissent does not dispute that
some release-dismissal agreements may meet the voluntariness standards set forth by the
plurality opinion and Justice O'Connor's concurrence; rather, he raises these as additional
concerns and indicates that the burden of proof should rest on the potential defendant in
the civil action-here the Government-and that the agreement should not be upheld if
that party cannot meet the burden. See id. at 417-18.
129 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 512 (2004) (plurality opinion) (noting that
the Mobbs Declaration was "the sole evidentiary support that the Government ha[d] pro-
vided to the courts for Hamdi's detention").
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tors leaning toward a finding of involuntariness in Hamdi's situa-
tion, 130 it is unlikely that a court would uphold the Release Agreement
as valid, even in the release-dismissal agreement context.
C. Is Hamdi's Expatriation Legitimate?
Even assuming the government could prove that Hamdi volunta-
rily agreed to renounce his citizenship, merely signing the Release
Agreement was not sufficient for Hamdi to expatriate. In addition to
a voluntary renunciation, Hamdi must also perform an expatriating
act with the specific intent to expatriate in order to fulfill the second
prong of the Afroyim and Terrazas standard. 131 Although the Release
Agreement left unanswered the question of whether Hamdi had per-
formed an expatriating act before signing the Agreement, 13 2 the lan-
guage of the Agreement implies that Hamdi's renunciation of his
citizenship before U.S. authorities in Riyadh would serve as an expatri-
ating act sufficient to sever his ties to the United States. 33 However,
to determine whether Hamdi performed an expatriating act prior to
signing the Release Agreement-or whether he performed an expatri-
ating act by renouncing his citizenship in accordance with the Release
Agreement-an analysis of Hamdi's actions under the Immigration
and Nationality Act13 4 is necessary. As the following analysis explains,
Hamdi did not perform an expatriating act prior to signing the Re-
lease Agreement,135 and the lack of voluntariness associated with the
Release Agreement itself' 3 6 leads to the conclusion that even his "for-
mal renunciation of nationality" does not meet the standards for vol-
untary expatriation under the Act.13 7 Therefore, Hamdi did not
perform an "expatriating act" with a specific intent to expatriate, and
the second prong of the Afroyim and Terrazas standard is not satisfied.
Presumably, if the government had chosen to adjudicate the
question of whether Hamdi renounced his citizenship prior to his cap-
ture in Afghanistan, 138 it would have argued that Hamdi expatriated
130 See Dorf, supra note 104 (arguing that "the factors tip in favor of invalidating
[Hamdi's] plea agreement. .. ").
131 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
132 See Release Agreement, supra note 3, at 1 ("[T]he question whether Hamdi has
performed an expatriating act under Section 349(a) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act... has not been adjudicated ...
133 See id. 6.
134 See 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (2000). The Immigration and Nationality Act codifies specific
acts that, if performed, constitute "expatriating acts." Id.
135 See id. (listing eight separate acts, the voluntary performance of which terminates
the actor's U.S. citizenship).
136 For a discussion of the voluntariness of the Release Agreement, see supra Part II.B.
137 See 8 U.S.C. § 1481. But see infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
138 The United States chose not to adjudicate this issue. See Release Agreement, supra
note 3, at 1-2.
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himself by "entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state
[when] . . . such armed forces [were] engaged in hostilities against the
United States."'139 Questions surround the exact nature of Hamdi's
activities in Afghanistan, 140 however, and Hamdi maintained that he
neither entered nor served with Taliban forces. 141 Furthermore, the
fact that Hamdi relied on his rights as an American citizen after his
detention by Northern Alliance forces and his transfer to Guanta-
namo Bay indicates that he still considered himself a citizen and ap-
preciated the benefits of his citizenship, even after his capture in
Afghanistan.142 Hamdi's actions in Afghanistan thus do not manifest
the specific expatriating intent required to renounce citizenship, and
the inquiry must turn to whether Hamdi's actual renunciation of his
citizenship is sufficient to meet this requirement.
Strictly under the terms of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
Hamdi's formal renunciation of his U.S. citizenship before the diplo-
matic officer in Saudi Arabia is an acceptable expatriating act. 143 The
Agreement allowed Hamdi a seven-day window between the time he
arrived in Saudi Arabia and the time he was required to renounce his
citizenship; 144 hence, his appearance before authorities in Riyadh was
technically of his own volition as a "free" man. However, section
349(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 145 states that while the
party performing the expatriating act "shall be presumed to have
done so voluntarily[,] . . . such presumption may be rebutted upon a
showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the act .. . per-
formed [was] not done voluntarily."'14 6 Furthermore, the Terrazas
Court stated that performance of a statutory expatriating act is merely
evidence of voluntariness; the act raises no presumption that the actor
possessed the specific intent to expatriate. 147
It is certainly more likely than not that Hamdi's formal renuncia-
tion of his citizenship was not voluntary and was not performed with
the specific intent to expatriate required under the Afroyim and Ter-
139 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (3) (A).
140 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
141 See Release Agreement, supra note 3, at 1.
142 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510-11 (2004) (plurality opinion).
143 See 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (5) (listing "a formal renunciation of nationality before a
diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state" as an expatriating
act); Release Agreement, supra note 3, 8.
144 See Release Agreement, supra note 3, 8.
145 8 U.S.C. § 1481(b).
146 Id.; see also Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 270 (1980) (noting that even if the
actor fails to prove that he acted voluntarily, "the question remains whether on all the
evidence the Government has satisfied its burden of proof that the expatriating act was
performed with the necessary intent to relinquish citizenship").
147 Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 268 ("Th[e] matter [of intent] remains the burden of the
party claiming expatriation to prove by a preponderance of the evidence.").
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razas standard.148 First, Hamdi's renunciation is tied too closely to the
Release Agreement itself to conclude reasonably that his expatriating
act was voluntary if his entry into the Agreement was not. If Hamdi
had not signed the Release Agreement, he would not have been free
to appear before authorities in Riyadh; instead, he would likely still be
imprisoned in a South Carolina military brig. 149 Hamdi agreed to re-
nounce his citizenship formally as a means to secure his release from
the coercive threat of indefinite detention, 150 and it is implausible
that this threat did not motivate Hamdi as he carried out his duties
under the Agreement. Thus, the same concerns of voluntariness that
surrounded Hamdi's entry into the Release Agreement apply to his
formal renunciation in Riyadh.151
Hamdi's personal history also suggests that he may not have cho-
sen to renounce his U.S. citizenship had he served his detention in
due course and returned to Saudi Arabia without the necessity of a
release agreement.152 Hamdi had retained dual citizenship between
Saudi Arabia and the United States for approximately eighteen years,
and although it is uncertain whether he affirmatively would have cho-
sen to keep his U.S. citizenship after his detention by the U.S. govern-
ment, his past ties to the United States suggest that his formal
renunciation was not an entirely voluntary act.153
Moreover, the Release Agreement itself provides that if Hamdi
fails to comply with any of the Agreement's requirements, he faces
immediate recapture and detention. 154 With such an explicit threat
designed to ensure his performance, it is more likely that Hamdi per-
formed the expatriating act merely to avoid recapture than to mani-
fest his intent to renounce his nationality. In other words, Hamdi's
specific intent was arguably to protect his liberty rather than to exer-
cise his "natural and inherent right" to expatriate; 155 therefore, his
expatriating act does not meet either the statutory or the Afroyim and
Terrazas standard for voluntary renunciation of citizenship.
In addition to Hamdi's waiver of any rights against the govern-
ment relating to its conduct in his capture and detention, the Agree-
ment also contains a promise by Hamdi to waive any challenges to the
terms and conditions of the Agreement itself.1 56 This waiver provision
148 See id. at 270; Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
149 See Release Agreement, supra note 3, 1.
150 See id. 8.
151 See supra Part II.B.
152 Presumably, all of the Taliban enemy combatants will be released after the end of
active hostilities in Afghanistan. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004).
153 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
154 See Release Agreement, supra note 3, 12.
155 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
156 See Release Agreement, supra note 3, 13.
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further supports the conclusion that Hamdi did not renounce his U.S.
citizenship voluntarily, because it indicates that the government may
have anticipated, and preemptively chosen to avoid, any objections to
the Agreement's coerciveness. The Agreement contains only a lim-
ited number of provisions potentially challengeable by Hamdi, and
most of these provisions are by their nature ones that lack real action-
able meaning: the provisions regarding Hamdi's release and transfer
provide little fodder for judicial action; 157 the provisions requiring
Hamdi to refrain from engaging in or assisting combatant activities
and to renounce terrorism and violentjihad have little practical mean-
ing to Hamdi, since he has never admitted to engaging in terrorist
activities or supporting terrorism in any way; 158 the residency and
travel restrictions seem more to edify the government than to con-
strict Hamdi's activities;159 and the conflict-of-laws and remaining pro-
cedural provisions similarly lack relevance to Hamdi now that he has
secured his release.160
The only provisions potentially worthy of challenge by Hamdi in-
clude the expatriation provision, the immediate-recapture provision,
and the waiver provision.1 61 Of these three, the Agreement's lan-
guage indicates that the government itself believed the expatriation
provision would be the most challengeable. The language immedi-
ately preceding Hamdi's signature reads, "I understand . . . [the
Agreement's] effect on my claim to United States citizenship. I un-
derstand this Agreement and voluntarily agree to it."162 The language
directly preceding the signatures of Hamdi's counsel states, "We have
carefully reviewed every provision of this Agreement... with the Peti-
tioner and have explained its effect on his claim to United States citi-
zenship. To our knowledge, the Petitioner's decision to enter into
this Agreement is an informed and voluntary one." 163 This language
indicates that the United States had an overwhelming concern with
confirming Hamdi's voluntary entry into the Agreement and implies
157 See id. 7 1-3.
158 See id. 77 4-5, 7.
159 See id. 1 9-11. Consider that the government imposed these restrictions even
though it had no evidence that Hamdi had ever traveled to the United States while living
in Saudi Arabia before his detention or that he ever traveled or desired to travel to Iraq,
Israel, Pakistan, Syria, the West Bank, or the Gaza Strip.
160 See id. 1 14-18; supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
161 See Release Agreement, supra note 3, 1 8, 12-13.
162 Id. at 4.
163 Id. This language should not necessarily serve as evidence that Hamdi voluntarily
entered into the Release Agreement. Not only must we consider the coercive circum-
stances surrounding the release, but asJustice Stevens noted in his Rumey dissent, "[e]ven
an ... informed" innocent person should not be forced to choose between indictment and
the surrender of his constitutional rights. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386,
403 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that even the government understood that Hamdi's renunciation of
his U.S. citizenship was the product of coercion.
Hamdi agreed to expatriate, and ultimately renounced his citi-
zenship, without the requisite voluntary, specific intent. Therefore,
the expatriation provision of the Agreement is not only unenforceable
from a contractual standpoint, but it is also unconstitutional. Because
the Release Agreement and its surrounding circumstances indicate
that the government required Hamdi to renounce his citizenship
without his full consent-and arguably realized the coercive nature of
its demand-the government's treatment of Hamdi represents an un-
constitutional "sever[ing of] its relationship" with him. 164
III
THE FUTURE OF CITIZEN ENEMY COMBATANTS IN
THE WAR ON TERROR AND BEYOND
If Yaser Hamdi had presented an isolated case of an American
citizen detained by the government as an enemy combatant, many
might accept the Release Agreement as an effective-although per-
haps flawed-means of ending Hamdi's detention while still respect-
ing American security interests in the War on Terror. Hamdi's case,
however, sets a dangerous precedent. 165 As the Saudi Arabian re-
sponse to the Release Agreement makes clear, the United States must
justify its treatment of citizen enemy combatants to maintain its legiti-
macy in the international community.
A. Saudi Arabia's Response to the Hamdi Release Agreement
Nail al-Jubeir, a spokesman for the Saudi Embassy, contended
that as an "issue of fairness," the Saudi Arabian government considers
the Release Agreement unenforceable and believes that the U.S. gov-
164 See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967).
165 Jose Padilla, the so-called "dirty bomber," see Fred Barbash, Padilla's Lawyers Suggest
Indictment Helps Government Avoid Court Flight, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Nov. 22, 2005, http:/
/www.washingtonpon.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/22/
AR2005112201061.html, was detained for three years as a citizen enemy combatant before
he was formally indicted in November 2005. See United States v. Hassoun, No. 04-60001-
CR-COOKE (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 17, 2005), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/
docs/padilla/uspadl 11705ind.pdf. Padilla was then transferred to a federal detention fa-
cility after the Supreme Court granted the Government's request for transfer. See Hanft v.
Padilla, No. 05-A578 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2006) (order granting transfer request), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/scotus10406opn.html. An agreement simi-
lar to Hamdi's Release Agreement was unlikely in Padilla's situation because the Govern-
ment did not "have a place to ship him to. He is an American citizen." Newshour withfim
Lehrer: Terror Suspect Yaser Hamdi Is Released (PBS television broadcast Sept. 22, 2004), avail-
able at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/uly-dec4/suspect_9-22.html. How-
ever, as this Note indicates, this fact may not bar the government from attempting to
transfer future citizen enemy combatants to ally nations. See infra Part III.B.
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ernment should have set Hamdi free without conditions. 66 Accord-
ing to al-Jubeir, "'If [Hamdi is] guilty of something, we don't believe
the U.S. government would let him go.' "167 AI-Jubeir's statements do
raise important questions regarding the government's sudden deci-
sion to release Hamdi after nearly three years of detention-questions
the Release Agreement does not answer. Hamdi's renunciation of
"terrorism and violent jihad"1 68 does not serve as an admission of
wrongdoing or a concession that his detention was authorized. In-
deed, Hamdi explicitly maintained that he was not an enemy combat-
ant.169 Although the government has implied that Hamdi's release
came only after a determination that he no longer posed a threat to
the United States, 170 it provided no explanation of the basis for this
determination or any justification for the length of Hamdi's
detention.171
Furthermore, al-Jubeir raised the concern that since the Saudi
Arabian government was not a party to the Release Agreement, it can-
not enforce the Agreement's provisions. 172 He also noted that the
Saudi Arabian government had "'asked the United States to provide
[the Saudi government] with whatever information [the U.S. govern-
ment has] on [Hamdi],"' but prior to Hamdi's release had received
"'nothing-no charges against him ... [or] direct evidence"' of any
wrongdoing. 73 These concerns regarding the Release Agreement led
166 Enemy Combatant's Release Delayed, supra note 7.
167 Id.
168 Release Agreement, supra note 3, 7.
169 Id. at 1 ("Hamdi maintains that he never affiliated with or joined a Taliban military
unit, never was an enemy combatant, that is, never was part of or supported forces hostile
to the United States and ... never engaged in armed conflict against the United States
170 See DOJ Press Release, supra note 2 ("[T] he United States has determined that Mr.
Hamdi could be transferred out of United States custody .... [T]he United States has no
interest in detaining enemy combatants beyond the point that they pose a threat to the
U.S. and our allies.").
171 See id.
172 Terror Suspect's Release Hits Snag, CBSNEws.coM, Sept. 30, 2004, http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/ 10/1 /national/main648566.shtml; see also Enemy Combat-
ant's Release Delayed, supra note 7 ("A1-Jubeir said the Saudi government objects to being
asked to enforce a deal in which it had no official say."). In a September 30, 2004 press
briefing, a spokesman for the U.S. Department of State addressed this concern: "[This] is
an agreement between Mr. Hamdi and the Justice Department. It does not involve the
Saudi authorities .... [H]ow it will be implemented ... is a matter for Mr. Hamdi's
lawyers, Mr. Hamdi or the Justice Department to discuss. It's not a matter involving the
Government of Saudi Arabia." Daily Press Briefing, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, U.S.
Dep't of State (Sept. 30, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2004/
36647.htm [hereinafter Daily Press Briefing].
173 CNNVS Wolf Blitzer Reports: Interview with Adel Al-Jubeir (CNN television broadcast
Sept. 28, 2004), available at http://saudiembassy.net/2004News/Statements/
TransDetail.asp?clndex=477.
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to a "snag"'174 in the release process that necessitated negotiations be-
tween the U.S. State Department and the Saudi government1 75 and
ultimately delayed Hamdi's transfer to Saudi Arabia by eleven days.176
The results of these negotiations have not been made public,1 77 and it
is unclear whether any changes were ultimately made to the Agree-
ment or the role of the Saudi government in its enforcement. 178 Re-
gardless of the negotiation results, the United States should use the
Saudi reaction to the Release Agreement as an indication of the need
to resolve the citizen enemy combatant dilemma and adjust its treat-
ment of both these combatants and its allies. In these arenas, policy
choices regarding both enemy and friend have grave ramifications for
the United States' legitimacy as an international power.179
174 See Terror Suspect's Release Hits Snag, supra note 172 ("The planned release of a...
suspected enemy combatant has been delayed . . . because of what the U.S. official de-
scribed as a snag in negotiations with the Saudi government."). But see Daily Press Briefing,
supra note 172 ("I wouldn't describe it as a snag at this point, there have just been some
things we had to work out .. ").
175 See Terror Suspect's Release Hits Snag, supra note 172.
176 Compare Release Agreement, supra note 3, 1 ("The United States agrees to release
Hamdi from United States custody.., no later than September 30, 2004...."), with DOS
Press Release, supra note 4 ("Mr. Hamdi arrived in Saudi Arabia on October 11, 2004.").
177 See Markon, supra note 100 ("It was unclear yesterday what was done to break the
impasse .... But sources familiar with the negotiations said a federal judge helped speed
the process by secretly ordering the government to bring Hamdi to a hearing .... ").
District Judge Robert G. Doumar did issue an order requiring the Government to submit
to the court copies of all documents it planned to use in its case against Hamdi if the
Government did not release Hamdi by a specified date. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No.
2:02CV439 (E.D. Va. Oct. 11, 2004) (order granting document request), available at http:/
/notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/2:02-cv-00439/docs/70250/0.pdf. Judge Doumar dis-
missed Hamdi's habeas corpus petition, but in an interesting choice of wording retained
jurisdiction to "enforce the terms of any valid settlement agreement." Id. (emphasis ad-
ded). It remains unknown, however, whether this order actually provided the impetus for
the Government to cease talks with the Saudi government and hasten Hamdi's release.
178 In an October 11, 2004 statement, State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher
thanked the Saudi government for facilitating Hamdi's transfer, but did not discuss the
Release Agreement. See DOS Press Release, supra note 4.
179 Questions have already been raised in the Arabic world regarding the legitimacy of
the United States' treatment of its citizens in the War on Terror. Writing for the widely-
read Arabic newspaper Dar Al-Hayat, columnist Jihad Al Khazen described various exam-
ples of Americans' liberty interests being violated by the government's "exceptional author-
ities" after September 11, 2001, and stated:
[I]f we were talking about an Arab, or Third World, country there
would not have been any issue to talk about, as the rule of law does not exist
in such countries. However, we are talking here about the country of laws
There is a famous English saying about an average man who tries to
live up to the lifestyle of his wealthy neighbors (the Joneses), which goes:
"Never keep up with the Joneses. Drag them down to your level."
My fear is that President Bush has understood that [Middle Eastern
countries] cannot keep up with the level of democracy, transparency, ques-
tioning, and rule of law of his country; as Iraq is not the model that he
wanted the countries of the region to imitate, and the plan for democracy
950
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B. The United States' Duty to Respect its Allies in the Transfer
of Citizen Enemy Combatants
Each aspect of the Saudi concerns with the Release Agreement
provides an example of more effective strategies that the United States
could utilize vis-A-vis its allies in future citizen enemy combatant situa-
tions. First, al-Jubeir expressed concerns regarding the lack of
charges against Hamdi in light of the United States' request that the
Saudi government enforce severe conditions against a seemingly inno-
cent individual.180 Perhaps security concerns prevent a complete pub-
lic explanation of the reasons for an enemy combatant's detention or
the government's justification for a combatant's release. 181 Without
any explanation by the government, however, such actions seems arbi-
trary; providing limited information about an enemy combatant's re-
lease from detention would add legitimacy to the government's
decision and would show respect to the ally to which it transfers the
combatant.182 Given that the government once considered Hamdi
too dangerous to be allowed access to counsel,183 it is especially troub-
ling that the government has not provided some explanation for why
it released Hamdi suddenly and transferred him to another
country. 184
in the Greater Middle East (GME) remains the same. The Americans are
laughing at us and we are laughing at them; however, there is no democracy ....
In such a situation, the President decided to drag his country down to
our levels of democracy and rule of law, in order for us to be able to com-
municate with one another.
Jihad Al Khazen, Ayoon wa Azan (Vhat I Fear), DAR AL-HAYAT, Oct. 24, 2004, available at
http://english.daralhayat.com/opinion/OPED/l 0-2004/Article-20041023-c73c59aa-cOa8-
Oled-0013-515e69b5a678/story.html (emphasis added).
180 See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
181 See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 926-27
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (denying release of information about detainees, explaining that "[i]t is
... well-established that the judiciary owes some measure of deference to the executive in
cases implicating national security, a uniquely executive purview"); N. Jersey Media Group,
Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that reporters did not have a
right of access to proceedings that were determined to present significant national security
concerns).
182 As al-Jubeir's statements regarding the Release Agreement suggest, allies of the
United States have confidence that the United States would not release a dangerous crimi-
nal. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
183 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
184 Many have speculated that the Release Agreement suggests that the Government
simply had no evidence against Hamdi and could not have satisfied the due process re-
quirements set out by the Hamdi plurality. See, e.g., Sonja Barisic, Is Hamdi About to be Re-
leased?, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 12, 2004, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/
article jsp?id=1090180324952 ("Michael Greenberger, who worked on counterterrorism
projects in the Clinton administration's Justice Department, said letting Hamdi go now is a
concession that the legal argument failed and that Hamdi himself is not a threat."); see also
supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (describing the due process requirements when
citizens challenge enemy-combatant status). This is not a sufficient reason, however, for
the government to remain silent or dismissive about its justifications for Hamdi's release.
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Al-Jubeir's concern that the U.S. government should not ask
Saudi Arabia to enforce an agreement to which it was not a party185
presents a somewhat more difficult problem to resolve. As noted by
State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, the Release Agree-
ment pertained primarily to Hamdi's citizenship and his rights against
the United States, and thus was the product of negotiations between
the government and Hamdi's counsel.18 6 If the necessity of similar
agreements arises in the future, however, the U.S. government should
at least consider confirming whether an allied government is willing
and able to assist the United States in enforcing the agreement's
terms. 187 Furthermore, in the future, the United States should refrain
from publicly dismissing its allies' concerns as it did during the Hamdi
negotiations with Saudi Arabia. l88 Again, showing respect for allies is
crucial to maintaining legitimacy in the War on Terror, and fully ac-
knowledging and contemplating our allies' valid concerns and per-
spectives 89 is another means of demonstrating this respect.
The third concern raised by al-Jubeir-the lack of information or
evidence provided to the Saudi government regarding Hamdi's al-
leged wrongdoing' 9 0-is perhaps the easiest to remedy in similar fu-
ture situations. Again, although the government must consider
national security concerns in its release of information, there are out-
lets the government could use to inform allies of pertinent informa-
tion about transferred individuals. For example, DistrictJudge Robert
G. Doumar ordered the United States to provide the evidence it
See Newshour with fim Lehrer: Terror Suspect Yaser Hamdi Is Released, supra note 165 (acknowl-
edging the government's relative silence about Hamdi's release but noting that "there
seems to be some indication that . . . his intelligence value is exhausted"). As part of
showing respect for the help of its allies and respect for its citizens' rights, the government
should be as forthright as possible regarding the release of combatants to other countries,
even if this means admitting a wrongful detention.
185 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
186 See supra note 172.
187 In Hamdi's case, the Release Agreement imposes a significant burden on Saudi
Arabian authorities to monitor Hamdi's activities. See Release Agreement, supra note 3, 1
6, 9, 10. The capabilities and willingness of the Saudis to help enforce this Agreement
should have been considered by the United States when it drafted the Agreement.
188 Spokesman Boucher's repeated statements that the Release Agreement is "not a
matter involving the Government of Saudi Arabia" represented the government's only pub-
lic response to concerns involving the lack of Saudi involvement in the Agreement. See
Daily Press Briefing, supra note 172; supra notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
189 See US, Saudi Still at Odds Over Release of Terror Suspect Hamdi, TURKISHPRESS.COM,
Oct. 4, 2004, http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=29570 (reporting the statements
of an anonymous State Department official and suggesting that the United States "was
losing patience with Riyadh's refusal to accept Hamdi, complaining that the Saudis had
not raised specific objections to his repatriation"). This Note suggests only that the United
States should consider allies' valid and specific concerns. Requiring the government to
consider any and all of its allies' concerns could lead to a situation of endless delay in
transferring combatants.
190 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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planned to use against Hamdi, and the Government produced this
evidence to the district court and Hamdi's counsel under seal and in a
classified manner. 191 The United States could undertake similar se-
curity measures to provide evidence to allies involved in enemy com-
batant transfers; this would at least allow allies to completely
determine the status they should afford the individual. 192
On a more fundamental level, there are additional concerns re-
garding how the United States handled Hamdi's release and what it
expected of the Saudi government. Even assuming arguendo that
Hamdi effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship and repatriated as a
Saudi, a situation now exists in which the United States is instructing
another country on how it must control its own citizens. 193 Although
this level of interference with a foreign ally's government is itself
troubling, the situation becomes even more disturbing when consider-
ing that the Release Agreement is likely invalid: Without a truly volun-
tary renunciation of his citizenship, Hamdi remains an American
citizen who is now completely subject to Saudi Arabian laws and is
under the control of Saudi authorities, at the behest of the United
States.194
Viewing the situation in this manner demonstrates the interplay
between the United States' duty to respect its allies in the War on
Terror and the United States' duty to respect its citizens-even those
it once considered enemies-because Hamdi's circumstances and his
transfer to Saudi Arabia do not represent an anomaly in the govern-
ment's treatment of citizens and allies. For example, the 2004 case of
Ahmed Abu AlP95 concerned a twenty-three-year-old American citi-
zen 96 who was detained in Saudi Arabia from June 2003 until Febru-
191 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 2:02:CV439 at 2 (E.D. Va. filed Oct. 11, 2004), available
at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/2:02-cv-00439/docs/70250/0.pdf.
192 See supra note 173 and accompanying text (noting that the Saudi government had
unsuccessfully requested information regarding Hamdi from the United States).
193 See supra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing the burden imposed upon
the Saudi government).
194 Under the terms of the Release Agreement, "the United States agree[d] to make
no request that Hamdi be detained by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia based on information
as to Hamdi's conduct known to the United States .. " Release Agreement, supra note 3,
3. But see CNN's Wolf Blitzer Reports: Interview with Adel AI-Jubeir, supra note 173 ("[The
Saudi Government] will have to talk to [Hamdi] to see where he may have violated our
laws and we will deal with him accordingly."). If Hamdi violates any provisions of the
Release Agreement, he will not be subject to Saudi law and may instead be taken back into
custody by American authorities as an enemy combatant. See supra notes 78-79 and accom-
panying text.
195 Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
196 Abu Ali was born in Houston, Texas, and lived in Virginia until graduating as vale-
dictorian from his high school and enrolling as a student at the Islamic University of Me-
dina in Saudi Arabia. Id. at 31-32.
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ary 2005.197 According to Abu Ali's father, an employee of the Saudi
Embassy in Washington, D.C., Saudi officials repeatedly described
Abu Ali's detention as "an 'American case' that Saudi Arabia ha[d] no
control over due to strong political pressure from the U.S. govern-
ment to keep Ahmed in Saudi custody."198 Abu Ali was allegedly tor-
tured in the Saudi prison, 199 and although Saudi officials indicated
that they would immediately release Abu Ali to the United States upon
a formal request for extradition, the United States filed no such re-
quest for nearly twenty months. 200 In an interesting coincidence, the
FBI allegedly contacted Abu Ali's parents during this detention period
and offered to release their son "if he revoked his U.S. citizenship and
lived in another country."'201
As DistrictJudge Bates stated in Abu Ali, "[A] citizen cannot be so
easily separated from his constitutional rights" as to permit the gov-
ernment to "work through the intermediary of a foreign country to
detain a United States citizen abroad." 20 2 Not only have Abu Ali's ar-
rest, detention, and possible torture with the knowledge and alleged
involvement of the United States harmed the citizen, but the U.S. gov-
ernment's use of foreign governments as pawns to perform acts that
would otherwise not withstand constitutional scrutiny demonstrates a
lack of respect for the proper treatment of foreign allies. Further-
197 Id. at 30; American Charged in Alleged Plot to Assassinate President Bush, CNN.coM, Feb.
23, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/02/22/bush.plot.charges/index.html
(describing the charges against Abu Ali as supporting terrorists and discussing the possible
assassination of President George W. Bush). A federal jury convicted Abu Ali in November
2005, and he is now facing twenty months to life in a federal prison. See Would-Be Bush
Assassin Could Face Life: Jury Rejects Claims that Confession was Product of Saudi Torture,
CNN.coM, Nov. 22, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/1/22/bush.plot.
198 Abu Ali, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 33; see also id. at 30-31 ("Petitioners have provided
evidence ... that: (i) the United States initiated the arrest of Abu Ali in Saudi Arabia; (ii)
the United States has interrogated Abu Ali in the Saudi prison; [and] (iii) the United
States is controlling his detention in Saudi Arabia .... The United States does not offer
any facts in rebuttal.").
199 Id. at 31, 36, 38.
200 Id. at 32, 38. Before the Hamdi and Rasul decisions, the United States also allegedly
indicated to Abu Ali and his family that if Abu Ali did not cooperate, he would either be
kept in a Saudi prison and tried without counsel or classified as an enemy combatant and
sent to Guantanamo Bay. Id. at 38. According to Abu Ali's counsel, when the U.S. govern-
ment learned that Abu Ali was planning to file a habeas corpus petition, "Saudi authorities
suddenly indicated they planned to press charges. Such charges might jeopardize U.S.
courts' jurisdiction over Abu Ali's case." ThomJ. Rose, U.S. Denies Foreign Detention of Citi-
zen, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2004, available at http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/
20040817-064339-5079r.htm. The exact circumstances surrounding Abu Ali's transfer to
the United States in February 2005 are unclear. See Saudis Deny Torturing Detained American,
CNN.coM, Feb. 23, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/02/23/saudi.statement (indi-
cating uncertainty over whether the transfer was the result of a U.S. request to either
charge or release Abu Ali, or whether it resulted from a deportation request made by Abu
Ali himself).
201 Abu Ali, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 34.
202 Id. at 31.
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more, the United States must remain mindful of the need to establish
its legitimacy in the Greater Middle East at this crucial time,203 and
utilizing Middle Eastern governments to avoid the requirements of
the democracy and rule of law that the United States hopes to model
for the region is an ineffective way to establish this legitimacy. 20 4 In
future situations involving citizens abroad, the United States should
not rely on foreign governments to circumvent the Constitution, and
the United States' treatment of its citizens should serve as a true exam-
ple for the governments of the region instead of providing a reason
for ridicule. 20 5
CONCLUSION
All parties involved in the Release Agreement most likely viewed
the Agreement as the easy way out. Hamdi received his return to
Saudi Arabia and the restoration of a relative freedom. 20 6 In return,
the United States received Hamdi's promise not to bring legal action
against the government for his detention, accomplished the removal
203 The first Iraqi elections were held on January 31, 2005. See Sporadic Violence Doesn't
Deter Iraqi Voters, CNN.coM, Jan. 31, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/
01/30/iraq.main. Thus, since the United States continues to be involved in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan, how these and surrounding countries view the U.S. government is of the utmost
importance to avoid fears such as those expressed by Al Khazen. See Al Khazen, supra note
179.
204 The United States has continually utilized foreign intelligence services to interro-
gate suspected enemy combatants in the War on Terror, and the CIA's network of so-called
"black sites" in Eastern Europe and Asia has allegedly been utilized for the torture of ter-
rorism suspects abroad. See Dana Priest, Secret Prison System Detains High-Level Terrorism Sus-
pects, SEATrLE TIMES, Nov. 2, 2005, at Al; Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse
But Defends Interrogations: "Stress and Duress" Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret
Overseas Facilities, WASH. PosT, Dec. 26, 2002, at Al. As one official involved in this process
remarked, "'We don't kick the [expletive] out of them. We send them to other countries
so they can kick the [expletive] out of them.'" Priest & Gellman, supra (alterations in origi-
nal). The United States has been involved with the arrest and detention of suspected com-
batants by, inter alia, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. See id. A State
Department official stated that although the United States officially claims to be involved
in these transfers only if the suspected combatants are wanted on criminal charges by al-
lies, "'sometimes a friendly country can be invited to "want" someone we grab."' Id. In a
notable example, Canadian citizen Maher Arar alleges he was taken by U.S. officials atJFK
Airport and sent to Syria, where he was detained and tortured for a year before being
released by the Syrian government as "completely innocent." See Complaint at 2, 19, Arar
v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-0429 (E.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 22, 2004), available at http://
www.maherarar.ca/cms/images/uploads/ArarComplaintFINAL.pdf.
205 See Al Khazen, supra note 179 ("[W]e are laughing at them .... [T]here is no
democracy ....").
206 This Note does not mean to suggest that the Release Agreement worsened Hamdi's
situation in any way other than the theoretical result of forcing his renunciation of his
citizenship. As Hamdi himself stated after his return to Saudi Arabia, he feels "awesome"
about being reunited with his family and being released from custody. See Phil Hischkorn,
Saudi Once Held by U.S. Returns Home: Hamdi Released After 'Enemy Combatant' Case Went to
High Court, CNN.coM, Oct. 11, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/l0/1l/
hamdi.
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from the country of what it once viewed as a potential security
threat, 20 7 and transferred the burden of monitoring Hamdi to an-
other country. 20 8 However, with the high stakes of the Release Agree-
ment's ramifications on citizens' rights and the legitimacy of its
foreign policy in the War on Terror, the United States should avoid
merely seeking simple solutions. Instead, it must strive to resolve fu-
ture citizen enemy combatant situations in a manner that both re-
spects the promises of the Constitution and models these promises to
the world.
207 See Newshour with Jim Lehrer: Terror Suspect Yaser Hamdi Is Released, supra note 165
("[Hamdi] can't come to the United States for the next ten years. And after that, he has to
seek the permission of the defense secretary before he comes here, which probably means
never.").
208 See id. ("[The United States gets to] reduce their prison population which is in-
creasingly burdensome.").
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